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Abstract
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the
network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network.
Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an unknown state that in reality
is an aggregate of the actions of their neighbors. Each time, every agent chooses an action
that maximizes her subjective expected payoff and then updates her beliefs according to what
she observes. In particular, we assume that each agent only observes her realized payoff. A
steady state of such dynamic is a selfconfirming equilibrium given the assumed feedback.
We characterize the structure of the set of selfconfirming equilibria in network games and we
relate selfconfirming and Nash equilibria. Thus, we provide conditions on the network under
which the Nash equilibrium concept has a learning foundation, despite the fact that agents may
have incomplete information. In particular, we show that the choice of being active or inactive
in a network is crucial to determine whether agents can make correct inferences about the payoff
state and hence play the best reply to the truth in a selfconfirming equilibrium. We also study
learning dynamics and show how agents can get stuck in non–Nash selfconfirming equilibria. In
such dynamics, the set of inactive agents can only increase in time, because once an agent finds
it optimal to be inactive, she gets no feedback about the payoff state, hence she does not change
her beliefs and remains inactive.
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1 Introduction
Imagine an online social network, like Twitter, with many users. Let us consider a simultaneous-
moves game, in which each user i decides her level of activity ai ≥ 0 in the social network. The
payoff that agents get from their activity depends on the social interaction. In particular, active user
i receives idiosyncratic externalities, that can be positive and negative, from the other users with
whom she is in contact in the social network. The externality from user i to user j is proportional to
the time that they both spend on the social network, ai and aj . Sticking to a quadratic specification,
that allows for linear best replies, let us assume that the payoff of i from this game is1
ui(ai,a−i) = αiai − 1
2
a2i +
∑
j∈I\{i}
zijaiaj . (1)
In eq. (1), I is the set of agents in the social network and ai is the level of activity of i ∈ I, while αi
represents the individual pleasure of i from being active on the social network in isolation, which
results in the bliss point of activity in autarchy. Parameter αi can also be negative, and in this case
i would not be active in isolation. For each j ∈ I\ {i}, there is some exogenous level of externality
from j to i denoted by zij . We say that j affects i, or that j is a peer of i, if zij 6= 0.
Later on, in this paper, we will also consider an extra global term in the payoff function
ui(ai,a−i) = αai − 1
2
a2i +
∑
j∈I\{i}
zijaiaj + β
∑
k∈j∈I\{i}
ak. (2)
We can interpret this extra term as an additional pleasure that i gets from being member (even if
not active) of an online social network that is overall popular.
In this paper, the network described by the matrix Z of all the zij ’s is exogenous. As a first
approximation, this fits a directed online social network like Twitter or Instagram, where users can-
not decide who follows them. Under this interpretation, i receives positive or negative externalities
from those who follow her, that are proportional to her activity. i acquires popularity from being
active or not in the social network. Payoff represents what i can indirectly observe about her own
popularity (i.e. likes that she receives, people congratulating with her in real world conversations,
and so on. . . ). We imagine that i cannot choose the style of what she writes, since she just follows
her exogenous nature. In this interpretation, ai represents the amount of tweets that i writes,
and this can make her more or less popular for those who follow her, according to how her style
combines with the (typically unobserved) tastes of each of her followers.
Since we are going to analyze learning dynamics and their steady states, we also have to specify
what agents observe after their choices, because this affects how they update their beliefs. Twitter
1This is the class of games originally analyzed by Ballester et al. (2006). Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) is one of the
more recent papers providing results for such linear-qadratic network games, and they discuss also how to generalize
to games that have the same best–reply functions. Zenou (2016) surveys many applications.
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user i typically observes perfectly her own activity level ai, but she may not observe the sign
of the externalities and the activity of others. However, she gets indirect measures of her level of
popularity that come from her conversations and experiences in the real world, where her popularity
from Twitter affects her social and professional real life. Players of this game may have wrong beliefs
about the details of the game they are playing (e.g. the structure of the network, or the value of
the parameters) and about the actions of other players. With this, they update their beliefs in
response to the feedback they receive, which will be their (possibly indirectly measured) payoff.
This updating process may lead to a learning dynamic that does not converge to a Nash equilibrium
of the game.
In this paper we address the following question: Assuming simple updating rules, under what
circumstances do learning dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game and when, instead,
do they just converge to a selfconfirming equilibrium where agents best reply to confirmed but
possibly wrong beliefs? This question is per se interesting, and with our answers we provide novel
theoretical tools for the analysis of network games. However, the application of the model to online
social networks that we just anticipated can also help in understanding why we may easily observe
apparently non–optimal best responses by economic agents in such an environment, such as agents
who get stuck into “inactivity traps.”
Section 2 presents our baseline model. For this setting, we characterize the set of selfcon-
firming equilibria in Section 3, and we study the learning process in Section 4. In Section 5 we
analyze a more general model that accounts for global externalities. Section 6 concludes. We
devote appendices to proofs and technical results. Appendix A analyzes properties of feedback
and selfconfirming equilibria in a class of games including as special cases the network games that
we consider. Appendix B reports existing results in linear algebra, that we use to find sufficient
conditions for reaching interior Nash equilibria in network games. Appendix C contains the proofs
of our propositions.
2 The framework
Consider a set I of agents, with cardinality n = |I| and generic element i, located in a network. Let
the network be characterized by an adjacency matrix Z ∈RI×I , where entry zij specifies whether
agent i is linked to agent j 6= i and the weight of this link, and we let zii = 0 by convention. In
what follows we consider the case of directed networks, so that, given i, j ∈ I, we allow zij > 0,
and zji = 0. Externality weights are an unknown parameter of the model. We assume that there
are commonly known upper and lower bounds w¯ and w in the weighted externalities, that can be
positive or negative, between players. We let Θ ⊆ [w, w¯]I×I denote the compact set of possible
weighted networks Z. The network game is parametrized by Z ∈ Θ.
Throughout the paper we will play with different properties and specifications of matrix Z. To
simplify the notation we will often decompose it in a way that distinguishes between the actual
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links, that specify if there is an externality between two players, and the magnitude and the sign
of this externality. We call Z0 ∈ {0, 1}I×I the basic underlying representation of the network, the
adjacency matrix whose ij element specifies whether the action of j has an externality on i. We
think of it as a link from i to j because j is one of i’s peers. Z0 is a directed network.
On top of that we build Z adding weights on the links of Z0. This can be done in several ways,
depending on how much heterogeneity we want to allow for. We will write Z = γZ0 when all links
bear the same level of externality γ ∈ [w, w¯]. We will write Z = ΓZ0, where Γ is a diagonal matrix,
when we want to specify that each player i is affected by the same weight γi ∈ [w, w¯] from all her
peers, but these γi’s are heterogeneous. We will also consider the case in which the existing links
may have weights of different signs but the same intensity. That is, we write Z = SZ0 (in which
the operator  is the Hadamard product), for γ ∈ [w, w¯], and S ∈ {−γ, γ}I×I . Finally, when we
write simply Z we consider the case of a directed weighted network Z ∈Θ. Many of our results will
hold for this most general case.
Each agent i ∈ I chooses an action ai from interval Ai = [0, a¯i], where the upper bound a¯i
is “sufficiently large”.2 For each i ∈ I, A−i := ×j 6=iAj denotes the set of feasible action profiles
a−i = (aj)j∈I\{i} for players different from i. Similarly, defining Ni := {j ∈ I : zij 6= 0} as the set
of the neighbors of a given agent i, ANi := ×j∈NiAj denotes the set of feasible action profiles
aNi := (aj)j∈Ni of i’s neighbors.
For each i ∈ I, we posit a set (interval) Xi = [xi, x¯i] of payoff states for i, with the inter-
pretation that i’s payoff is determined by her action ai and by her payoff state xi according to a
continuous utility function vi : Ai × Xi → R. The payoff state xi is in turn determined by the
actions of i’s neighbors and is unknown to i at the time of his choice. For each agent i ∈ I and
matrix Z, we consider a parametrized aggregator of the coplayers’ actions `i : A−i × Θ → Xi of
the following form: `i is continuous, its range `i (A−i ×Θ) is connected, and for each Z ∈ Θ, the
section of `i at Z is
3
`i,Z : A−i → Xi,
a−i 7→
∑
j 6=i zijaj .
Note, since Xi is the codomain of `i, we are effectively assuming that, for every Z ∈ Θ,
xi ≤
∑
j∈N−i
zij a¯j , x¯i ≥
∑
j∈N+i
zij a¯j ,
where N−i := {j ∈ I : zij < 0} denote the set of neighbors of player i that have a negative effect
2Note that in the network literature it is common to assume Ai = R+. However, for the games we consider, we
can always find an upper bound a¯ on actions such that the problem is unchanged when actions are bounded above
by a¯.
3In principle we can allow for non–linear aggregators, as in Feri and Pin (2017). However, in this paper, we focus
on the linear case.
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on the payoff state of i. Similarly, N+i := {j ∈ I : zij > 0} denotes the set of neighbors of player i
that have a positive effect on the payoff state of i.
The overall payoff function that associates each action profile (ai,a−i) with a payoff for agent
i is thus parametrized by the adjacency matrix Z:
ui : Ai ×A−i ×Θ → R,
(ai,a−i,Z) 7→ vi (ai, `i (a−i,Z)).
(3)
We assume that each agent i knows how her payoff depends on her action and her payoff state,
that is, we assume that i knows function vi, but we do not assume that i knows Z. Actually, from
the perspective of our analysis, agent i might even ignore that the payoff state xi aggregates her
neighbors’ activities according to some weighted network structure, because we are not modeling
how i reasons strategically.4 If vi,xi : Ai → R is strictly quasi–concave for each xi, there is a unique
best reply ri (xi) to each payoff state xi. Although the aggregator is linear, if this “proximate” best
reply function ri : Xi → Ai is non-linear,5 then also the best reply ri (`i (a−i,Z)) is non-linear in
a−i. Linearity obtains if and only if vi is quadratic in ai and linear in xi. Without substantial loss
of generality, among such utility functions we consider the following form, generalizing equation (1)
that we discussed earlier:
vi : Ai ×Xi → R,
(ai, xi) 7→ αiai − 12a2i + aixi.
(4)
Note that vi in eq. (4) is continuous and strictly concave in ai. Thus, G =
〈
I,Θ, (Ai, ui)i∈I
〉
, with
ui defined by eqs. (3)-(4), is a parametrized nice game (see Moulin 1984 for a definition of nice
game, and Appendix A for a generalization, with results for non-linear-quadratic network games).
We assume that the game is repeatedly played by agents maximizing their instantaneous payoff.
After each play agents get some feedback. Let M be an abstract set of “messages” (e.g., monetary
outcomes). The information obtained by agent i ∈ I at the end of each period is described by a
feedback function fi : Ai×Xi →M . Assuming that i knows how her feedback is determined by
the payoff state given her action, if she receives message m after action ai she infers that the state
xi belongs to the “ex post information set”
f−1i,ai (m) :=
{
x′i ∈ Xi : fi
(
ai, x
′
i
)
= m
}
.
This completes the description of the object of our analysis. The structure
NG =
〈
I,Θ, (Ai, Xi, vi, `i, fi)i∈I
〉
4If the parametrized payoff functions and the parameter space Θ are common knowledge, strategic reasoning
according to the epistemic assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality can be captured by a simple
incomplete-information version of the rationalizability concept. See, e.g., Chapter 7 of Battigalli (2018) and the
references therein.
5More precisely, not affine.
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is a (parameterized) network game with feedback, or simply network game. Our analysis
depends on assumptions about the payoff functions and the feedback functions. Here we present
the strongest assumptions, the Appendix contains a more general analysis.
Definition 1. A network game with feedback NG is linear-quadratic if the utility function of
each player has the linear-quadratic form (4).
In this case, the proximate best-reply function is
ri (xi) =

0, if xi ≤ −αi,
αi + xi, if −αi < xi < a¯i − αi,
a¯i, if xi ≥ a¯i − αi.
(5)
Even if agent i may play a best reply to the aggregate xi, it is possible to write the derived best
reply to the actions of others as
ri (`i (a−i,Z)) =

0, if
∑
j 6=i zijaj ≤ −αi,
αi +
∑
j 6=i zijaj , if −αi <
∑
j 6=i zijaj < a¯i − αi,
a¯i, if
∑
j 6=i zijaj ≥ a¯i − αi.
(6)
Definition 2. Feedback fi satisfies observability if and only if player i is active (OiffA) if
section fi,ai is injective for each ai ∈ (0, a¯i] and constant for ai = 0; fi satisfies just observable
payoffs (JOP) relative to vi if there is a function v¯i : Ai ×M → R such that
∀ (ai, xi) ∈ Ai ×Xi, vi (ai, xi) = v¯i (ai, fi (ai, xi))
and the section v¯i,ai : M → R is injective for each ai ∈ Ai. A network game with feedback NG
satisfies observability by active players if feedback fi satisfies OiffA, for each player i ∈ I, and
it satisfies just observable payoffs if fi satisfies JOP for each player i ∈ I.
In a game with just observable payoffs, because of injectivity of the feedback function, agents
infer their realized payoff from the message they get, but no more than that, that is, inferences
about the payoff state can be obtained by looking at the preimages of the payoff function. For
example, the feedback could be a total benefit, or revenue function
fi : Ai ×Xi → R,
(ai, xi) 7→ αiai + aixi,
with the payoff given by the difference between benefit and activity cost Ci (ai):
vi : Ai ×Xi → R,
(ai, xi) 7→ fi (ai, xi)− Ci (ai).
Under the reasonable assumption that agent i knows her cost function, when she chooses ai and
then gets message m, she infers that her payoff is v¯i (ai,m) = m− Ci (ai). Thus, each section v¯i,ai
(ai ∈ Ai) is indeed injective. If the feedback/benefit function is fi (ai, xi) = αiai + aixi, then it
satisifes observability if and only if i is active.
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Remark 1. If NG is linear-quadratic and satisfies just observable payoffs, then it satisfies observ-
ability by active players. If NG satisfies observability by active players, then
f−1i,ai (fi (ai, xi)) =
{
Xi, if ai = 0,
{xi} , if ai > 0
(7)
for every agent i ∈ I and action-state pair (ai, xi) ∈ Ai ×Xi.
Most of our analysis focuses on linear-quadratic network games with just observable payoffs.
This implies that agents who are active get as feedback a message enabling them to perfectly
determine the state. Conversely, inactive agents get a completely uninformative message.
To choose an action, subjectively rational agents must have some deterministic or probabilistic
conjecture about the payoff state xi. We refer to conjectures about the state as shallow con-
jectures, as opposed to deep conjectures, which concern the specific network topology and the
actions of other players (a−i). In linear-quadratic network games (more generally, in nice games
with feedback), it is sufficient to focus on deterministic shallow conjectures. Indeed, for every prob-
abilistic conjecture µi ∈ ∆ (Xi), there exists a deterministic conjecture xˆi ∈ Xi that justifies the
same action a∗i as the unique best reply (see the discussion in A.1).
2.1 Selfconfirming equilibrium
We analyze a notion of equilibrium which is broader than Nash equilibrium. Recall that our
approach allows for the possibility of agents who are unaware of the full game around them. In
equilibrium, agents best respond to conjectures consistent with the feedback that they receive,
which is not necessarily fully revealing. We believe that this approach fits well to a networked
environment where agents’ knowledge and the information they receive are only local.6
Definition 3. A profile (a∗i , xˆi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I (Ai ×Xi) of actions and (shallow) deterministic con-
jectures is a selfconfirming equilibrium (SCE) at Z if, for each i ∈ I,
1. (subjective rationality) a∗i = ri (xˆi),
2. (confirmed conjecture) fi (a
∗
i , xˆi) = fi
(
a∗i , `i
(
a∗−i,Z
))
.
The two conditions require that 1) each agent best responds to her own conjectures; 2) the
conjectures in equilibrium must belong to the ex-post information set so that the expected feedback
coincides with the actual feedback at `i
(
a∗−i,Z
)
. We say that a∗ = (a∗i )i∈I is a selfconfirming
6In a context of endogenous strategic network formation, McBride (2006) applies the conjectural equilibrium
concept, which is essentially the same as selfconfirming equilibrium for games with feedback (see Battigalli et al.
(1992) and the discussions in Battigalli et al. 2015). More recently, also Lipnowski and Sadler (2017) and Frick et al.
(2018) have adopted self–confirming equilibrium notions to describe network games. Their assumptions and their
results are different and independent from ours.
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action profile at Z if there exists a corresponding profile of conjectures (xˆi)i∈I such that (a
∗
i , xˆi)i∈I
is a selfconfirming equilibrium at Z, and we let ASCEZ denote the set of such profiles. Also, for any
adjacency matrix Z ∈ Θ, we denote by ANEZ the set of (pure) Nash equilibria of the (nice) game
determined by Z, that is,
ANEZ :=
{
a∗ ∈ ×i∈IAi : ∀i ∈ I, a∗i = ri
(
`i
(
a∗−i,Z
))}
.
Nice games satisfy all the standard assumptions for the existence of Nash equilibria.7 Hence, we
obtain the existence of selfconfirming equilibria for each Z ∈ Θ. Indeed a Nash equilibrium is a
selfconfirming equilibrium with correct conjectures. To summarize:
Remark 2. For every Z, there is at least one Nash equilibrium, and every Nash equilibrium is a
selfconfirming profile of actions:
∀ Z ∈ Θ, ∅ 6= ANEZ ⊆ ASCEZ .
3 A characterization of SCE
In this section we characterize the set ASCEZ of selfconfirming equilibrium profiles of actions in
linear-quadratic network games with just observable payoffs. All our proofs are derived from the
results in Appendix A and Appendix B, which refer to the case of generic network games without
the restriction to linear best replies, and are stated in Appendix C. We start with the simplest case
in which every agent necessarily finds it subjectively optimal to be active (that is, being inactive is
dominated – see Lemma A in Appendix A).
Proposition 1. Consider a network game NG satisfying observability by active players. Assume
that, for every i ∈ I and for every xˆi ∈ Xi, ri (xˆi) > 0. Then, for each Z ∈ Θ, ASCEZ = ANEZ .
Assume that αi (from eqs (4) and (5)) is such that αi > 0. Assume further that Z = γZ0,
with γ > 0 and that Z0 ∈ {0, 1}I×I . This represents the standard case of local complementarities
studied by Ballester et al. (2006). If γ (n− 1) < 1 there is a unique Nash equilibrium which is also
interior. Our proposition states that, in this case, if being inactive is not justifiable as a best reply
to any shallow conjecture, then there is only one selfconfirming equilibrium action profile, which
necessarily coincides with the unique Nash equilibrium.
We now consider a more general case in which agents may be inactive. Let I0 denote the set
of players for whom being inactive is justifiable. Note that, by Lemma A in Appendix A,
I0 = {i ∈ I : min ri (Xi) = 0} .
7Since the self-map a 7→ (ri (a−i,Z))i∈I is continuous on the convex and compact set A = ×i∈I [0, a¯i], by Brouwer’s
Theorem it has a fixed point.
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Also, for each Z ∈ Θ and non–empty subset of players J ⊆ I, let ANEJ,Z denote the set of Nash
equilibria of the auxiliary game with player set J obtained by imposing ai = 0 for each i ∈ I\J ,
that is,
ANEJ,Z =
{
a∗J ∈ ×j∈JAj : ∀j ∈ J, a∗j = rj
(
`j
(
a∗J\{j},0I\J ,Z
))}
,
where 0I\J ∈ RI\J is the profile that assigns 0 to each i ∈ I\J . If J = ∅, let ANEJ,Z = {∅} by
convention, where ∅ is the peudo-action profile such that (∅,0I) = 0I .8 We relate the set of
selfconfirming equilibria to the sets of Nash equilibria of such auxiliary games.
Proposition 2. Suppose that network game with feedback NG is linear-quadratic and satisfies
just observable payoffs. Then, for each Z ∈ Θ, the set of selfconfirming action profiles is
ASCEZ =
⋃
I\J⊆I0
ANEJ,Z ×
{
0I\J
}
,
that is, in each SCE profile a∗, a subset I\J of players for whom being inactive is justifiable choose
0, and every other player chooses the best reply to the actions of her coplayers. Therefore, in each
SCE profile a∗ and for each player i ∈ I,
a∗i = 0⇒ xi ≤ −αi,
a∗i > 0⇒
αi +∑
j∈I
zija
∗
j > 0 ∧ a∗i = min
a¯i, αi +∑
j∈I
zija
∗
j

 . (8)
In every SCE we can partition the set of agents in two subsets. Agents in J ⊆ I are active,
i.e., they choose a strictly positive action, agents in I \ J instead choose the null action. Start
considering the latter. Since they play a∗i = 0, they get null payoff independently of others’
actions. But, since every conjecture xˆi ∈ (−∞,−αi] is consistent with this payoff, their conjecture
is (trivially) consistent with their feedback. As for agents in J , since they choose a strictly positive
action a∗i > 0, they receive a message that enables them to infer the true payoff state x
i; with this,
they necessarily choose the objective best reply to their neighbours actions, whether or not they are
aware of them. Note that, if being inactive is justifiable for every agent (I0 = I), then 0I ∈ ASCEZ
for every Z ∈ Θ.
This implies that the set of selfconfirming equilibria can be characterized by means of the sets of
Nash equilibria of the auxiliary games in which only active agents are considered. If, for example,
there is a unique interior Nash equilibrium for the auxiliary game corresponding to every subset of
active players, then |ASCEZ | = 2|I|, that is, there are exactly 2n SCE action profiles. A.3 discusses
the equilibrium characterization for the generalized case of non linear-quadratic network games.
8As we do in set theory with the empty set, when we consider functions whose domain is a subset of some index
set I, it is convenient to have a symbol for the pseudo-function with empty domain. For example, if I = N, such
functions are (finite and countably infinite) sequences, or subsequences, and ∅ is the empty sequence.
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Example 1. Consider Figure 1, representing a network between 4 nodes. We set αi = 0.1 for each
player i. Let us first assume that each arrow represents a positive externality of 0.2 (and arrows
point to the source of the externality). In this case we have one NEs, but 16 possible SCEs, one for
each subset of the players that we allow to be active. Table 1 reports the action of players in each
case (we omit redundant pairs and singletons). Note that player 3, when active, always plays the
same action a3 = 0.1, because she is not affected by any externality. Other players, instead, play
differently when active, according to who else is active.
Figure 1: A network between 4 nodes. Every arrow is for an externality of equal magnitude and
sign.
All {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} . . . ∅
a1 0.1292 0.1 0.125 0.1292 0 0.1 0.1 0.125 0
a2 0.1750 0.14 0.15 0 0.144 0.12 0 0 0
a3 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
a4 0.1458 0 0.125 0.1458 0.12 0 0 0.125 0
Table 1: Self confirming equilibria of the network from Figure 1, with all positive externalities of
0.2. The unique Nash Equilibrium is in bold.
Consider now the same network, but assume that each arrow represents a negative externality of
0.6. In this case we have more NEs (there is not a NE where all players are active, but there
are 3 NEs), but less than 16 SCEs (there are 13), because for some subset J of players (such as
J = I = {1, 2, 3, 4}) there is no SCE in which all its elements are active. Table 2 reports the actions
of players in each case (we omit redundant pairs and singletons). N
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{1,2,4} {2,3,4} {1, 2} {1,3} {1, 4} . . . ∅
a1 0.0625 0 0.1 0.1 0.0625 0
a2 0.025 0.016 0.04 0 0 0
a3 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
a4 0.0625 0.04 0 0 0.0625 0
Table 2: Self confirming equilibria of the network from Figure 1, with all negative externalities of
−0.6. Nash Equilibria are in bold.
This simple example shows that moving from a case of full complementarity to a case of full
substitability, we may increase the number of Nash Equilibria and decrease the number of SCEs.
However, even in the limiting case where substitution effects are extremely strong, the two sets of
equilibria will not coincide, because the strategy profile in which everyone is inactive will be a an
SCE but not an NE.
3.1 Assumptions about the network
Next, we focus on the network Z. We list below some properties of matrix Z that are not maintained
assumptions. In different parts of the paper we will use some of these assumptions to have sufficient
conditions for the existence and stability of selfconfirming equilibria. We refer to Appendix B for
a deeper discussion on these assumptions and their implications.
Assumption 1. Matrix Z of size n has bounded values, i.e. |zij | < 1n for all i and j.
Assumption 2. Matrix Z has the same sign property i.e., for every i, j, sign(zij) = sign(zji),
where the sign function can have values −1, 0 or 1.9
Assumption 3. Matrix Z is negative, i.e. zij < 0 for all i and j,
We recall here that the spectral radius ρ(Z) of Z is the largest absolute value of its eigenvalues.
Assumption 4. Matrix Z is limited, i.e. ρ(Z) < 1.
In Section 2 we discussed how, in some cases, we can write Z as Z = ΓZ0, where Γ is a diagonal
matrix, and Z0 is the basic underlying representation of the network. When this is possible, matrix
Z represents a basic network combined with an additional idiosyncratic effect by which every agent
i weights the effects of the others on her. This effect is modeled by the parameter γi.
10 The next
9The sign condition is the one used in Bervoets et al. (2016) to prove convergence to Nash equilibria in network
games, under a particular form of learning.
10Then the payoff of i ∈ I at a given profile a of the original game is
ui (a) = αai − 1
2
a2i + aiγi
∑
j∈I
z0,ijaj = αai − 1
2
a2i + ai
∑
j∈I
zijaj .
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assumption adds an additional condition on Z0.
Assumption 5. Matrix Z is symmetrizable, i.e. it can be written as Z = ΓZ0, with Γ diagonal
and Z0 symmetric. Moreover, Γ has all positive entries in the diagonal.
Note that if Z is symmetrizable then all its eigenvalues are real. Moreover, since Γ has all
positive entries, Assumption 5 implies the sign condition from Assumption 2.
Our final assumption is discussed in Bramoulle´ et al. (2014) and combines Assumptions 4 and 5
above.
Assumption 6. Z = ΓZ0 is symmetrizable-limited, i.e. Z is symmetrizable and, for every i, j,
zij = z0,ij
√
γiγj, is limited.
Our previous results from Section 3, about the characterization of selfconfirming equilibria,
state that we can choose any subset of agents and have them inactive in a SCE. However we cannot
ensure that the other agents are active, because their best response in the reduced game could be
null. The next result goes in the direction of specifying under which sufficient conditions this does
not happen. Given the matrix Z, and given J ⊆ I, we call ZJ the submatrix who has only rows
and columns corresponding to the elements of J .
Proposition 3. Consider a set J ⊆ I. Let us assume that ZJ satisfies at least one of the three
conditions below:
1. it has bounded values (Assumption 1),
2. it is negative and limited (Assumptions 3 and 4),
3. or it is symmetrizable–limited (Assumption 6).
Then, we have the two following results:
1. ANEJ,Z =
{
aNEJ
}
, such that aNEJ > 0;
2. There exists a∗ ∈ ASCEZ such that a∗ =
{
aNEJ
}× {0I\J} .
Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions to have an arbitrary set of active and inactive players
in a selfconfirming equilibrium. In this case the set of selfconfirming equilibria has cardinality equal
to the cardinality of the power set 2I , that is 2n.
We provide here below two examples, one with all positive externalities, the other with mixed
externalities.
Example 2. Consider n players, and a randomly generated network between them, of the type
Z = ΓZ0, generated by the following generating process. Z0 is undirected, generated by an Erdos
12
and Re´nyi (1960) process for which each link is i.i.d., and such that its expected number of overall
links (i.e., counted in both directions) is k · n, for some k ∈ R+. This means that the expected
number of links for each player is k. It is well known that this model predicts, as n goes to infinity,
that Z0 will have no clustering and, when k ≥ 2, a connected giant component.
Γ is a diagonal matrix, such that each element γi in the diagonal is positive and is generated
by some i.i.d. random process with mean µ and variance σ2.
In this case, Fu¨redi and Komlo´s (1981) prove that the expected highest eigenvalue of Z, as n grows,
is
E(λi) = kµ+
σ2
µ
+O
(
1√
n
)
.
From Proposition 3, under Assumption 6, as n tends to infinity, Z is symmetrizable–limited if
E(λi) < 1, which implies that
µ− σ2
µ2
> k .
Clearly, a necessary condition for previous inequality to hold is that µ > σ2.
When this happens, as n grows to infinity, we will always have a unique NE of the game where all
players are active.
Note that this limiting result excludes the possibility (because the expected clustering of Z0 goes
to 0) that there is a subset J of players, that have a dense sub–network between them, and a high
realization of γi’s, such that there does not exist a
∗ ∈ ASCEZ , for which a∗ =
{
aNEJ
} × {0I\J} .
In fact, if this was the case, because of only positive externalities, we would not even have an all
active equilibrium for the whole population of n agents. N
Example 3. Proposition 3 provides alternative conditions, that are only sufficient, for interior NE
in an auxiliary game in which only agents in J are considered. Figure 2 provides an example of
game that do not satisfy any of them, but still has a unique interior NE. We set αi = 0.1 for each
player i. Every blue arrow stands for a positive externality of 0.2 (so, the blue arrows represent
just the first case from Example 1). The two red arrows stand for a negative externality of 0.2.
This network game has a unique NE, and 16 SCE. Table 3 shows them all (redundant couples and
singletons are omitted). N
All {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3} . . . ∅
a1 0.1257 0.1 0.125 0.128 0 0.1 0.1 0.125 0 0
a2 0.1603 0.1346 0.15 0 0.144 0.12 0 0 0.1154 0
a3 0.0412 0.731 0 0.720 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.0729 0
a4 0.1336 0 0.125 0.14 0.12 0 0 0.125 0 0
Table 3: Self confirming equilibria of the network from Figure 2, with positive externalities of 0.2
and negative externalities of −0.2. The unique Nash Equilibrium is in bold.
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Figure 2: A network between 4 nodes. Blue arrows are for positive externalities, red arrows are for
negative externalities.
4 Learning process
We have not considered any dynamics yet. Definition 3 of selfconfirming equilibrium, characterized
also by the conditions stated in Proposition 2, identifies steady states: If agents happen to have
selfconfirming conjectures and play accordingly, then they have no reason to move away from it.
However we may wonder how agents get to play SCE action profiles, and if these profiles are stable.
We first notice that SCE has solid learning foundations.11 The following result is specifically
relevant for this paper (see Gilli (1999) and Chapter 6 of Battigalli (2018)). Consider a sequence
in time of action profiles, given by (at)
∞
t=0. Then, if (at)
∞
t=0 is consistent with adaptive learning
12
and at → a∗, it follows that a∗ must be a selfconfirming equilibrium action profile.
Of course, the limit of the trajectory may or may not be a Nash equilibrium. Let us now con-
sider a best response dynamics. This generates trajectories that—by construction—are consistent
with adaptive learning. With this, we prove convergence (under reasonable assumptions), hence
convergence to an SCE.
To ease the analysis we consider best reply dynamics for shallow conjectures. For each period
t ∈ N and each agent i ∈ I, ai,t = r (xˆi,t) is the best reply to xˆi,t. After actions are chosen, given
the feedback received, agents update their conjectures. If conjectures are confirmed then an agent
keeps past conjecture, otherwise she updates using as new conjecture the conjecture that would
11See, for example, Battigalli et al. (1992), Battigalli and Marinacci (2016), Fudenberg and Kreps (1995), and the
references therein.
12In a finite game, a trajectory (at)
∞
t=0 is consistent with adaptive learning if for every tˆ, there exists some T such
that, for every t > tˆ + T and i ∈ I, ai,t is a best reply to some deep conjecture µi that assigns probability 1 to the
set of action profiles a−i consistent with the feedback received from tˆ through t − 1. The definition for compact,
continuous games is a bit more complex (cf Milgrom and Roberts (1991)), who assume perfect feedback).
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have been correct in the past period. In details,
xˆi,t+1 =
{
xˆi,t if ai,t = 0,
`i (a−i,t,Z) if a∗i,t > 0,
(9)
and, from (5) (considering that the upper bound a¯i is set so that it is never reached) we have simply
ai,t+1 = ri (xˆi,t+1) =
{
0, if xˆi,t ≤ −αi,
αi + xˆi,t+1, if xˆi,t > −αi.
Coherently with the previous analysis, this update rule states that if an agent i at time t is inactive
(ai,t = 0), past conjectures are confirmed and thus kept. If instead the agent is active (ai,t > 0),
feedback is such that agents can perfectly infer the payoff state xi,t = `i (a−i,t,Z), and so they
update conjectures according to (9). This is one possible adaptive learning dynamics. The result
cited above implies that if the dynamics described above converges, then it must converge to a
selfconfirming equilibrium, i.e., a rest point where players keep repeating their choices.
In this section we analyze the stability of such rest points in the simplest possible case of
robustness to small perturbations, as in Bramoulle´ and Kranton (2007). However, we will not
consider perturbations to the strategy profile, but perturbations on the profile of conjectures.
Definition 4 (Learning process). Each player i ∈ I starts at time 0 with a belief, and beliefs are
represented by a vector of shallow deterministic conjectures xˆ0 = (xˆi,0)i∈I . In each period t players
best reply to their conjectures: for each i ∈ I, ai,t = max{αi + xˆi,t, 0}.
At the beginning of each period t + 1 each player i keeps his t-period shallow conjecture if he
was inactive, and updates his conjecture to period-t revealed payoff state if he was active, that is,
xˆi,t+1 =
ui(at)
ai,t
− αi + 12ai,t.
Even if we consider the case of linear best replies, from equations (8) and (9), the system is not
linear because
xˆi,t+1 =
{
xˆi,t if xˆi,t ≤ −αi ,∑
j∈I zijaj,t if xˆi,t > −αi ,
and for every other player j, we have that aj,t = max{αj + xˆj,t, 0}.
Clearly an SCE of the game, as defined in the beginning of Section 3, is always a rest point of
this learning dynamic. We now consider the stability of such rest points a∗. Say that a profile of
conjectures xˆ is consistent with a∗ if a∗i = ri (xˆi) for every i ∈ I.
Definition 5. A selfconfirming action profile a∗ ∈ ASCEZ is locally stable if there are a profile of
conjectures xˆ and  > 0 consistent with a∗ such that the learning dynamics starting from any xˆ′
with ‖xˆ′ − xˆ‖ <  converges back to xˆ.
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4.1 Results
Each SCE is characterized by a set of active agents. So, given a strategy profile a = (ai)i∈I , let
Ia = {i ∈ I : ai > 0} denote the set of active players. With this, for each action profile a, ZIa
denotes the submatrix with rows and columns corrsponding to players who are active in a. This
allows us to characterize locally stable selfconfirming equilibria.
Proposition 4. Consider a∗ ∈ ASCEZ . a∗ is locally stable if
• Assumption 4 holds for matrix ZIa∗ ;
• for some xˆ consistent with a∗ and every i ∈ I\Ia∗, αi + xˆi < 0.
Intuitively, consider a sufficiently small perturbation of players’ conjectures. The first condition
ensure that active players keep being active and their actions converge back to the Nash equilbirium
of the auxiliary game with player set Ia∗ . The second condition ensures that inactive players keep
being inactive. Next, we provide alternative sufficient conditions that allow to characterize the
subsets of active agents associated to SCEs.
Proposition 5. Consider a selfconfirming strategy profile a∗ ∈ ASCEZ . If ZIa∗ satisfies at least
one of the three conditions below:
1. it has bounded values (Assumption 1),
2. it is negative and limited (Assumptions 3 and 4),
3. or it is symmetrizable–limited (Assumption 6),
then a∗ is locally stable and, for every J ⊆ Ia∗, there exists a locally stable selfconfirming
equilibrium a∗∗ ∈ ASCEZ such that
1. ANEJ,Z =
{
aNEJ
}
, with aNEJ > 0J ;
2. {a∗∗} = {aNEJ }× {0I\J} .
The proof is based on results from linear algebra. In fact, if an adjacency matrix satisfies one of
the conditions from Proposition 5, then also every submatrix of that matrix satisfies that property.
We know that there may be SCEs that are not Nash equilibria, because some agents are inactive
even if this is not a best response to the actions of the others. Proposition 5 tells us two additional
things. Under the stated conditions, for any given SCE a∗ with set of active agents Ia∗ , any subset
J ⊆ Ia∗ of those agents is associated to a stable SCE where all agents in J are active, and the other
agents are inactive. Second, since the empty subset of agents is trivially associated to the stable
SCE where every agent is inactive, for every network game there is always a subset J of agents
associated to a stable SCE where all and only the agents in J are active.
16
4.2 Examples and discussion
The following example shows that we can reach SCEs that are not NE also if the initial beliefs
induce all positive actions at the beginning of the learning dynamic.
Example 4. Consider the case of 4 players, with the network matrix Z ∈ {−0.2, 0, 0.2}I×I shown
in Figure 2, and, for every i, αi = 0.1. This is a case of general externalities, that can be positive
or negative. Figure 3 shows the learning dynamics of actions and beliefs that start from different
initial conditions. In one case (left panels) we converge to the unique Nash equilibrium of this game
(the dotted lines), in the other (right panels) the learning dynamics put, after 2 rounds, one player
out from the active agents, and the remaining 3 converge to a selfconfirming equilibrium which is
not Nash. N
Figure 3: General strategic externalities. Starting from different beliefs on the same network (from
Figure 2), the learning process may converge to the unique Nash equilibrium (left panels) or to
a SCE which is not a Nash equilibrium (right panels). Note that actions are just an upward
translation of beliefs, by the quantity α.
The next example (which does also not satisfy the local stability conditions of Proposition 5)
shows that convergence may not occur even in a simple case of positive externalities.
Example 5. Now consider again the network from Example 1 (Figure 1), with 4 nodes. Even if
there are only positive externalities, the magnitude of γ may imply convergence or not. If γ < 1,
there is convergence. If instead γ ≥ 1 there is divergence. Figure 4 shows two cases, with γ = 0.9
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and γ = 1 respectively, starting from the same initial beliefs. Note that, nodes/players 1 and 4
reinforce each other, and this gives rise to an oscillating behavior of their beliefs. N
Figure 4: Only positive externalities. Starting from the same beliefs on the same network structure
(from Figure 1), the learning process may converge or not depending on the size of γ: γ = 0.9 in
the left panel; γ = 1 in the right panel. We report only beliefs because, as in Figure 4, actions are
just an upward translation of beliefs, of amount α..
Our notion of stability with respect to conjectures relates to the standard notion of stability
with respect to actions in the following way. First of all, since played actions are justified by
some conjectures, the only reason for these actions to change is a perturbation of the surrounding
conjectures, but this is not a sufficient condition. If all agents are active, the two definitions have the
same the consequences in terms of stability, since a perturbation with respect to actions happens
if and only if every agent’s conjecture is perturbed. However, if a selfconfirming equilibrium has
inactive agents, then those inactive agents who play a corner solution do not show perturbation in
actions when their conjectures are perturbed. This implies that if an action profile is stable with
respect to actions perturbations, then it is also stable under conjectures perturbations, but the
converse does not hold.
5 Local and Global externalities
As anticipated when discussing Eq. (2), we consider now an extension to the case of equation (4),
in which we add a global externality term with no strategic effects. For each i ∈ I, we posit an
interval Yi = [yi, y¯i], a coefficient β ∈ R, and we consider the following aggregator:13
13This aggregator g sums up the actions of all the agents in the network except agent i. We could have considered
agent i as well, but we opted for this specification so as not to change the first order condition with respect to the
case with just local externalities.
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gi,β : A−i → Yi
a−i 7→ β
∑
j 6=i aj
.
We assume that every agent i ∈ I knows Yi. Then, we let yi = gi (a−i, β) and we maintain the
assumption that xi = `i (a−i,Z). The new parametrized utility function is
vi : Ai ×Xi × Yi → R
(ai, xi, yi) 7→ αiai − 12a2i + aixi + yi
, (10)
where both xi and yi are unknown. The general form of the feedback function is
fi : Ai ×Xi × Yi →M .
Deterministic shallow conjectures for each i ∈ I are now determined by the pair (xˆi, yˆi) ∈ Xi × Yi.
We provide now the definition of selfconfirming equilibrium for games with global externalities.
Definition 6. A profile (a∗i , xˆi, yˆi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I (Ai ×Xi × Yi) of actions and (shallow) deterministic
conjectures is a selfconfirming equilibrium at Z and β of a linear quadratic network game with
feedback and global externalities if, for each i ∈ I,
1. (subjective rationality) a∗i = ri (xˆi),
2. (confirmed conjecture) fi (a
∗
i , xˆi, yˆi) = fi
(
a∗i , `i
(
a∗−i,Z
)
, gi
(
a∗−i, β
))
.
Notice that the rationality condition is unchanged with respect to the case of only local exter-
nalities since best-reply conditions are not affected by the global externality term. To compare this
game with the linear-quadratic network game with only local externalities, we consider the case of
just observable payoffs. Then, without loss of generality we can assume that fi = vi for every i ∈ I.
With this, we can characterize the SCE set as follows:
Proposition 6. Fix Z ∈ Θ and β. Every selfconfirming equilibrium profile (a∗i , xˆi, yˆi)i∈I ∈
×i∈I (Ai ×Xi × Yi) of a linear-quadratic network game with global externalities and just observ-
able payoffs is such that, for every i ∈ I,
1. if a∗i = 0, then xˆi ∈ (−∞,−αi], yˆi = yi;
2. if a∗i > 0, then a
∗
i = αi + xˆi, yˆi = yi + a
∗
i (xi − xˆi).
We discuss how the presence of the global externality term in the utility function changes
radically the characterization of selfconfirming equilibria. As before, we assume that players observe
their own realized payoffs. Yet, when global externalities are present, observability by active players
does not hold anymore. Inactive players have correct conjectures about the global externality,
but may have correct or incorrect conjectures about the local externality. Active players, on the
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other hand, are not able to determine precisely the magnitude of the local effects with respect
to the global effects. Given any strictly positive action a∗i , the confirmed conjectures condition
yields (yˆi − yi) = a∗i (xi − xˆi). Then, in equilibrium, if agent i overestimates (underestimates) the
local externality, she must compensate this error by underestimating (overestimating) the global
externality. Then, compared to the case of only local externalities, we have that: (i) active agents
choose a best response to a (typically) wrong conjecture about x; thus, (ii) it is not possible to
characterize SCE by means of Nash equilibria of the auxiliary games restricted to the active players.
We present now a simple example showing how wrong conjectures about local and global ex-
ternalities may have a big effect on equilibrium actions.
Example 6. Consider three agents in a line network. Let agent 2 be at the center of the line.
Then, for every (a∗,Z, β), `2
(
a∗−2,Z
)
is proportional to g2
(
a∗−2, β
)
, always with the same ratio,
while this is not true for agents 1 and 3. We assume that each agent thinks to be playing in a
complete network, so every i ∈ I thinks that `i
(
a∗−i,Z
)
is always proportional to gi
(
a∗−i, β
)
, with
the same ratio. In this case agents 1 and 3 think to be more central than what they actually are.
Table 4 provides the Nash equilibria for the actual network and for the complete network, and the
selfconfirming equilibrium actions for the case described above.
Line NE Complete NE SCE
a1 0.130 0.167 1.569
a2 0.152 0.167 1.679
a3 0.130 0.167 1.569
Table 4: Simulations for the case of α = 0.1, γ = 0.2, and β = 1. Columns refer to 1) Nash
Equilibrium of the line network; 2) Nash equilibrium of complete network; 3) SCE in the line
network in which each i ∈ I believes that `i
(
a∗−i,Z
)
= γβ gi
(
a∗−i, β
)
.
Simulations show that if agents overestimate the impact of local externalities this generates a
multiplier effect that makes equilibrium actions increase at a level even larger that what would be
predicted in a complete network by Nash equilibrium. This is the result of how agents misinterpret
their feedbacks. In details, thinking to be in a complete network makes agents 1 and 2 overestimate
local externalities. Take for instance agent 1. Given any a−1, she chooses a best reply higher
than the Nash equilibrium one since she overestimates the local externality. This high action has
the effect of increasing the global externality term for agent 3. Agent 3, by overestimating local
externality, partly attributes this higher global externality to the local externality term, and chooses
an action larger than predicted by Nash equilibrium. The choice of agent 3 increases in turns the
global externality perceived by agent 1, and so on. At the same time agent 2, as neighbors choose
higher actions, increases her own action level. This effect goes on and a multiplier effect seems to
be at place. In the limit, selfconfirming equilibrium actions are almost ten times larger than the
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complete network Nash equilibrium. N
5.1 Learning with Global Externalities
We now consider the learning process that originates from an adaptive updating of conjectures, as
we did for the case of only local externalities. For an easy reference, we rewrite here Eq. (2) as a
payoff function that depends on players’ actions, with the time index and specifying xi,t and yi,t as
functions of co-players’ actions:
ui,t(ai,t,a−i,t) = αai,t − 1
2
a2i,t + ai,t
∑
j∈I\{i}
zijaj,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
xi,t
+β
∑
k∈I\{i}
ak,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
yi,t
.
To ease the analysis, we assume the same parameter α for each player and we focus on the case
of strictly positive justifiable actions. We obtain this by assuming that α > 0 and that all the
elements of Z are nonnegative. This case, however, is a bit more complex since, at each time, there
are infinitely many collections of feasible pairs (xˆi,t, yˆi,t)i∈I compatible with adaptive learning. For
every i ∈ I, and each time t, let mi,t = fi (ai,t, xi,t, yi,t) = ui(ai,t,a−i,t) be the message agents
receive. Then, given xˆi,t, yˆi,t is uniquely determined. In details, at each time period, agent i’s
conjecture is a pair (xˆi,t, yˆi,t) consistent with the message received at the previous period. We
obtain
yˆi,t+1 = mi,t − αai,t + 1
2
(ai,t)
2 − ai,txˆi,t+1 .
Given message mi,t−1, and considering that agents perfectly recall their past actions, yˆi,t is uniquely
determined as a function of xˆi,t. We can just focus on the dynamics of xˆi,t. The dynamics of xˆi,t
is given by the following equation
xˆi,t+1 =
mi,t − yˆi,t+1
ai,t
− α+ 1
2
ai,t (11)
To avoid bifurcations at each time period, we need to use simplifying assumptions. We define
ci,t :=
xˆi,t
yˆi,t
.14 (12)
Then,
Assumption 7. For each i ∈ I and for each t ∈ N, ci,t = ci,t+1 = ci.
We call ci the perceived centrality of player i. For each player, this parameter describes
what she thinks to be the share of the activity in her neighborhood with respect to the sum of all
14In doing so, we implicitly assume that players think that not all the other players play the null action ak,t = 0.
This is actually a reasonable assumption, because under positive externalities any best response ak,t should be at
least α.
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the actions of the population. This perceived share has a strong relationship with the Bonacich
centrality. In the unique Nash equilibrium a∗ of the game, where all actions are positive, we have
a∗i = α+ xi = α+
∑
j∈I\{i}
zija
∗
j .
The profile of Bonacich centrality measures b is the unique solution of the linear system15
bi = α+
∑
j∈I\{i}
zijbj .
So, when beliefs are correct, as in the Nash equilibrium, we have bi = ai and ci =
bi−α
yi
. Now, in the
Nash equilibrium we have also 1yi − 1yj = β
aj−ai
yiyj
. If the number of players is large, we have yi  ai
and yj  aj , which implies 1yi ' 1yj , and so every ci is roughly the same linear rescaling of bi.
From equation (11), and expressing the message as the observed payoff, we get that the following
learning dynamic
xˆi,t+1 = xi,t +
yi,t
ai,t
− yˆi,t+1
ai,t
. (13)
Plugging in ci,t =
xˆi,t
yˆi,t
we get
xˆi,t+1 =
ci,t
1 + ci,tai,t
(ai,txi,t + yi,t) . (14)
We define the true centrality of player i at time t as
c′i,t =
xi,t
yi,t
.
Note that c′i,t ∈ [0,
∑
j 6=i zij
β ]. For this reason, we also assume that the perceived centrality of
each player i is such that ci ∈
(
0,
∑
j 6=i zij
β
]
, and this specifies the set of all admissible perceived
centralities. The dynamic, then, can be written as
xˆi,t+1 = ciyi,t
a∗i,tc
′
i,t + 1
a∗i,tci + 1
,
which implies that the conjecture is correct only when ci = c
′
i,t.
We look at best responses ai,t+1 = α + xˆi,t+1, and study existence and characterization of the
steady state of this learning process. Recall that yi,t = β
∑
j 6=i aj,t. To find a fixed point we look
at the system of n equations
Hi(a
∗, c, β,Z) := α+ ci
β∑
j 6=i
a∗j
 a∗i c′i + 1
a∗i ci + 1
− a∗i = 0 . (15)
15In general, independently of any game defined on the network, Bonacich centrality is a network centrality measure
that depends on a paramater α > 0. It is defined exactly as the solution of that same linear system. For a detailed
discussion on this see Dequiet and Zenou 2017
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For comparison, we also study the system of equations that provide the Nash Equilibrium of this
network game, namely:
Fi(a
∗, β,Z) := α+
∑
j∈I
zija
∗
j − a∗i = 0 . (16)
Let A ⊂ [α,∞)I denote the set of the solutions of the system (15). We have the following result.
Proposition 7. If the system defined by (16) admits a solution, then for each vector c of perceived
centralities also the system defined by (15) admits a solution. Moreover, the system implies a
homeomorphism Φ between all profiles c and A. Homeomorphism Φ is monotone with respect to
the lattice order of the two sets.
The previous result provides information only on the steady states of our dynamical system.
Note however that the homeomorphism is implied by the particular learning dynamic that we are
assuming, which is based on constant belief centralities. Here below we show a result that provides
sufficient conditions for convergence of the learning dynamic. We impose as a sufficient condition
that local and global externalities are not too large.
Proposition 8. If, for each player i ∈ I, 0 < ciβ(n−1) <
∑
j 6=i zij < 2, then the dynamic defined
by the learning process (15) always converges to its unique solution, which is stable.
It should be noted that we are not requiring that |∑j 6=i zij | < 1, which would imply that
Assumption 4 hold.
Example 7. Under the conditions of Proposition 8, we use equation (14) to run dynamical systems
converging to the SCE implicitely defined by (15). This allows us to provide a graphical illustration
of Proposition 7, for the case of three nodes. As in Example 6, we do this for the case of a line
network (where each of the two links is bidirectional), and for the case of a complete network.
Figure 5 shows the results. We can start from any pattern of perceived centralities for the three
nodes. The left panel shows the profile of perceived centralities when at least one node has maximal
perceived centrality (the three faces of the cube have different colors, according to which node has
the maximal centrality). The central panel shows the corresponding SCE conjectures xˆ when the
network is a line (the node that has perceived centrality 1 in the red dots is the central node). The
right panel shows the corresponding SCE beliefs xˆ when the network is a complete triangle. The
figure suggests that homeomorphism Φ (from Proposition 7) is highly non linear, because of the
self reinforcement process in beliefs that we discussed in Example 6. The figure also shows that, as
stated by Proposition 7, homeomorphism Φ respects the lattice order on the two sets. N
Proposition 7 tells us that a non-negative shift in each perceived centrality will always result
in a non-negative shift in each agent’s action in the resulting SCE. However, Proposition 8 gives
an implicit warning. Too high perceived centralities may imply that the sufficient conditions for
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Figure 5: Simulations showing the homeomorphism of Proposition 8 for the case of 3 nodes. The
left panel shows vectors of preceived centralities. The central panel shows the corresponding SCE
beliefs xˆ when the network is a line (the node that has perceived centrality 1 in the red dots is
the central node). The right panel shows the corresponding SCE beliefs xˆ when the network is a
complete triangle.
stability are lost, and convergence to the corresponding SCE may be lost. Note also that, summing
up equation (2) for all the players, the aggregate welfare is maximized if the vector of actions
satisfies the linear system
a∗i = α+ (n− 1)β +
∑
j∈I\{i}
(zij + zij)a
∗
j .
Social platforms like Facebook and Twitter often provide information to users about the activity
of their peers. A rationale for this marketing strategy can be that these companies want to change
the beliefs of players, making them feel more important (i.e. central) in the social network. Even a
benevolent social planner may want to set the perceived centralities to the level for which the social
optimum is achieved. However, according to our model, if perceived centralities are too high, the
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system may become unstable.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we lay the basis for a novel approach to network games. Many of the applications of
those games mimic large societies with million of nodes and non regular distribution of connections.
It is natural to assume that players are not aware of the complete structure of the network; thus,
they do not perform sophisticated strategic reasoning possibly leading to a Nash equilibrium, but
just best–respond to some to subjective beliefs affected by information feedback they receive. We
analyze simple adaptive dynamics and show that in some cases they converge to stable Nash
equilibria. However, we characterize also those situations in which feasible stable outcomes are not
Nash equilibria, but rather selfconfirming equilibria in which some (if not all) players have wrong
beliefs and yet the feedback they receive is consistent with such beliefs. We also show that simple
biases in the perception of own centrality in the network may lead players to play action profiles
that are very far from the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
The natural application of this approach is to online social platforms like Facebook and Twitter.
Using a linear quadratic structure for the payoff function we have also laid the ground for a tractable
welfare analysis of the model. However, policy implications are not straightforward if we want to
consider the long–run benefits of connections and not only about the instantaneous payoffs of the
users of those platforms.
Our analysis does not account for the strategic reasoning that agents can perform given some
commonly know features of the network. For example, known results about rationalizability imply
that, if the (nice) network game has strategic complementarities and is common knowledge, then
sophisticated strategic reasoning leads to Nash equilibrium.16 If only some aspects of the network
game are commonly known, then both strategic reasoning and learning affect the long-run outcome,
which is a kind of rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium. This is a topic we are working on.
16On nice games with strategic complementaries see, e.g., Chapter 5 of Battigalli (2018) and the references therein.
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Appendix A Selfconfirming equilibria in parametrized nice games
with aggregators
In this section we develop a more general analysis of selfconfirming equilibria in a class of games
that contains the linear-quadratic network games with feedback. To ease reading, we make this
section self-contained repeating some definitions from the main text.
A parametrized nice game with aggregators and feedback is a structure
G =
〈
I,Θ, (Ai, `i, vi, fi)i∈I
〉
where
• I is the finite players set, with cardinality n = |I| and generic element i.
• Θ ⊆ Rm is a compact parameter space.
• Ai = [0, a¯i] ⊆ R+, a closed interval, is the action space of player i with generic element
ai ∈ Ai.
• Xi = [xi, x¯i] ⊆ R, a closed interval, is the a space of payoff states for i.
• `i : A−i × Θ → Xi (where A−i = ×j∈I\{i}Aj) is a continuous parametrized aggregator of
the actions of i’s coplayers such that its range `i (A−i ×Θ) is connected.17
• vi : Ai×Xi → R is the payoff (utility) function of player i, which is strictly quasi-concave
in ai and continuous,
18 and from which we derive the parameterized payoff function
ui : Ai ×A−i ×Θ → R,
(ai,a−i, θ) 7→ vi (ai, `i (a−i, θ)).
Thus, xi = `i (a−i, θ) is the payoff relevant state that i has to guess in order to choose
a subjectively optimal action. With this, for each θ ∈ Θ, 〈I, (Ai, ui,θ)i∈I〉 is a nice game
(Moulin, 1979), and
〈
I,Θ, (Ai, ui)i∈I
〉
is a parametrized nice game. We let
ri : Xi → Ai
xi 7→ arg maxai∈Ai vi (ai, xi)
denote the best reply function of player i.
17Since the range of each section `i,θ must be a closed interval, we require that the union of the closed intervals
`i,θ (A−i) (θ ∈ Θ) is also an interval, which must be closed because Θ is compact and `i continuous.
18That is, vi is jointly continuous in (ai, xi) and, for each xi ∈ [xi, x¯i], the section vi,xi : [0, a¯i] → R has a unique
maximizer a∗i (that typically depends on xi), it is strictly increasing on [0, a
∗
i ], and it is strictly decreasing on [a
∗
i , a¯i].
Of course, the monotonicity requirement holds vacuously when the relevant subinterval is a singleton.
26
• Let M ⊆ R be a set of “messages,” fi : Ai×Xi →M is a feedback function that describes
what i observes (a “message,” e.g., a monetary outcome) after taking any action ai given any
payoff state xi.
19
On top of the formal assumptions stated above, we maintain the following informal assumption
about players’ knowledge of the game:
• Each player i knows vi and fi.
Unless we explicitly say otherwise, we instead do not assume that i knows θ, or function `i, or
even that i understands that his payoff is affected by the actions of other players. However, since
i knows the feedback function fi : Ai ×Xi → M and the action he takes, what i infers about the
payoff state xi after he has taken action ai and observed message m is that
xi ∈ f−1i,ai (m) :=
{
x′i : fi
(
ai, x
′
i
)
= m
}
.
A.1 Conjectures
Definition A. A shallow conjecture for i is a probability measure µi ∈ ∆ (Xi). A (deep)
conjecture for i is a probability measure µ¯i ∈ ∆ (A−i ×Θ). An action a∗i is justifiable if there
exists a shallow conjecture µi such that
a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
Xi
vi (ai, xi)µi (dxi) ;
in this case we say that µi justifies a
∗
i . Similarly, we say that (deep) conjecture µ¯i ∈ ∆ (A−i ×Θ)
justifies a∗i if the shallow conjecture induced by µ¯i (µi = µ¯i ◦ `−1i ∈ ∆ (Xi)) justifies a∗i .
Remark 3. If ai 7→ vi (ai, xi) is strictly concave for each xi, then also ai 7→
∫
Xi
vi (ai, xi)µi (dxi)
is strictly concave and the map
µi 7→ arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
Xi
vi (ai, xi)µi (dxi)
is a continuous function.20
The following lemma summarizes well known results about nice games (see, e.g., Battigalli 2018)
and some straightforward consequences for the more structured class of nice games with aggregators
considered here:
Lemma A. The best reply function ri : Xi → Ai is continuous, hence its range ri (Xi) is a closed
interval, just like Xi. Furthermore, for each given a
∗
i ∈ Ai, the following are equivalent:
19Here the assumption that M is a set of real numbers is without loss of generality, because the same holds for the
set of payoff states Xi.
20When ∆ (Xi) is endowed with the topology of weak convergence of measures.
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• a∗i is justifiable,
• a∗i ∈ ri (Xi) (that is, a∗i is justified by a deterministic shallow conjecture),
• there is no ai such that vi (a∗i , xi) < vi (ai, xi) for all xi ∈ Xi (that is, a∗i is not dominated by
any other pure action).
Corollary A. Suppose that the aggregator `i is onto. Then, an action of player i is justifiable if
an only if it is justified by a deep conjecture.
Proof. The “if” part is trivial. For the “only if” part, fix a justifiable action a∗i arbitrarily. By
Lemma A, there is some xi ∈ Xi such that a∗i = ri (xi). Since the aggregator `i is onto, there is
some (a−i, θ) ∈ `−1i (xi) such that
a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
ui (ai,a−i, θ) .
Hence a∗i is justified the deep conjecture δ(a−i,θ), that is, the Dirac measure supported by (a−i, θ).

With this, from now on we restrict our attention to (shallow, or deep) deterministic conjectures.
A.2 Feedback properties
Definition B. Feedback fi satisfies observable payoffs (OP) relative to vi if there is a function
v¯i : Ai ×M → R such that
vi (ai, xi) = v¯i (ai, fi (ai, xi))
for all (ai, xi) ∈ Ai×Xi; if the section v¯i,ai is injective for each ai ∈ Ai, then we say that fi satisfies
just observable payoffs (JOP) relative to vi. Game G satisfies (just) observable payoffs if, for
each player i ∈ I, feedback fi satisfies (J)OP relative to vi.
If fi satisfies JOP, we may assume without loss of generality that fi = vi, because, for each
action ai, the partitions of Xi induced by the preimages of vi,ai and fi,ai coincide:
Remark 4. Feedback fi satisfies JOP relative to vi if and only if
∀ai ∈ Ai,
{
v−1i,ai (u)
}
u∈vi,ai (Xi)
=
{
f−1i,ai (m)
}
m∈fi,ai (Xi)
. (a)
Proof. (Only if) Fix ai ∈ Ai. Since fi satisfies JOP relative to vi, vi,ai (Xi) = (v¯i,ai ◦ fi,ai) (Xi)
(by OP), for each u ∈ vi,ai (Xi) there is a unique message mai,u = v¯−1i,ai (u) (by injectivity of v¯i,ai),
and
v−1i,ai (u) = {xi ∈ Xi : vi (ai, xi) = u}
= {xi ∈ Xi : v¯i (ai, fi (ai, xi)) = u}
= {xi ∈ Xi : fi (ai, xi) = mai,u} = f−1i,ai (mai,u) ,
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which implies eq. (a).
(If) Suppose that eq. (a) holds. For every ai ∈ Ai and m ∈ fi,ai (Xi) select some ξi (ai,m) ∈
f−1i,ai (m). Let
D :=
⋃
ai∈Ai
{ai} × fi,ai (Xi)
With this,
ξi : D → Xi
is a well defined function. Domain D is the set of action-message pairs for which the definition of
v¯i matters. Define v¯i as follows:
v¯i (ai,m) =
{
vi (ai, ξi (ai,m)) if (ai,m) ∈ D,
0 otherwise.
By construction, eq. (a) implies that
∀ (ai, xi) ∈ Ai ×Xi, v¯i (ai, fi (ai, xi)) = vi (ai, xi) .
Hence, OP holds. Furthermore, for all ai ∈ Ai, m′,m′′ ∈ fai (Xi),
m′ 6= m′′ ⇒ ξi
(
ai,m
′) 6= ξi (ai,m′)
⇒ vi
(
ai, ξi
(
ai,m
′)) 6= vi (ai, ξi (ai,m′′))
⇒ v¯i
(
ai,m
′) 6= v¯i (ai,m′)
where the first and the second implications follow from eq. (a) (ξi (ai,m
′) and ξi (ai,m′) belong
to different cells of the coincident partitions, hence yield different utilities), and the third holds by
construction. Therefore, v¯i,ai is injective for every ai, which means the JOP holds. 
Definition C. Feedback fi satisfies observability if and only if i is active (OiffA) if section
fi,ai is injective for each ai > 0 and constant for ai = 0. Game G satisfies observability by active
players if OiffA holds for each i.
Remark 5. If NG is linear-quadratic and satisfies just observable payoffs, then it satisfies observ-
ability by active players.
Proof. By Remark 4 JOP implies that, for each ai ∈ Ai,{
v−1i,ai (u)
}
u∈vi,ai (Xi)
=
{
f−1i,ai (m)
}
m∈fi,ai (Xi)
.
The linear-quadratic form of vi implies that, for every xi ∈ Xi,
v−1i,0 (vi,0 (xi)) = Xi
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∀ai > 0, v−1i,ai (vi,ai (xi)) = {xi} .
These equalities imply that fi,0 is constant and fi,ai is injective for ai > 0, that is, NG satisfies
observability by active players. 
Definition D. Feedback fi satisfies own-action independence (OAI) of feedback about the state
if, for all justifiable actions a∗i , a
o
i and all payoff states xˆi, xi ∈ Xi,
fi (a
∗
i , xˆi) = fi (a
∗
i , xi)⇒ fi (aoi , xˆi) = fi (aoi , xi) .
Game G satisfies own-action independence of feedback about the state if, for each player i ∈ I,
feedback fi satisfies OAI.
In other words, OAI says that if player i cannot distinguish between two payoff states xˆi and
xi when he chooses some given justifiable action a
∗
i , then he cannot distinguish between these two
states when he chooses any other justifiable action aoi . This is equivalent to requiring that the
partitions of Xi of the form
{
f−1i,ai (m)
}
m∈fi,ai (Xi)
coincide across justifiable actions, i.e., across
actions ai ∈ ri (Xi) (see Lemma A).
The following lemma—which holds for any game, not just nice games—states that, under payoff
observability and own-action independence, an action is justified by a confirmed conjecture if and
only if it is a best reply to the actual payoff state:
Lemma B. If fi satisfies payoff observability relative to vi and own-action independence of feedback
about the state, then for all (a∗i , xi) ∈ Ai ×Xi the following are equivalent:
1. there is some xˆi ∈ Xi such that a∗i ∈ arg maxai∈Ai vi (ai, xˆi) and fi (a∗i , xˆi) = fi (a∗i , xi),
2. a∗i ∈ arg maxai∈Ai vi (ai, xi).
Proof.(Cf. Battigalli et al. 2015, Battigalli 2018) It is obvious that (2) implies (1) independently
of the properties of fi. To prove that (1) implies (2), suppose that fi satisfies OP-OAI and let xˆi
be such that (1) holds. Let aoi be a best reply to the actual state xi. We must show that also a
∗
i is
a best reply to xi. Note that both a
∗
i and a
o
i are justifiable; hence, by OAI, fi (a
∗
i , xˆi) = fi (a
∗
i , xi)
implies fi (a
o
i , xˆi) = fi (a
o
i , xi). Using OP, condition (1), and OAI as shown in the following chain
of equalities and inequalities, we obtain
vi (a
∗
i , xi)
(OP)
= v¯i (a
∗
i , fi (a
∗
i , xi))
(1)
= v¯i (a
∗
i , fi (a
∗
i , xˆi))
(OP)
= vi (a
∗
i , xˆi)
(1)
≥
vi (a
o
i , xˆi)
(OP)
= v¯i (a
o
i , fi (a
o
i , xˆi))
(1,OAI)
= v¯i (a
o
i , fi (a
o
i , xi))
(OP)
= vi (a
o
i , xi) .
Since ao is a best reply to xi and vi (a
∗
i , xi) ≥ vi (aoi , xi), it must be the case that also a∗i is a best
reply to xi. 
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Corollary B. Suppose that G satisfies payoff observability and own-action independence of
feedback about the state, then the sets of selfconfirming action profiles and Nash equilibrium action
profiles coincide for each θ:
∀θ ∈ Θ, ASCEθ = ANEθ .
Proof By Remark 2, we only have to show that ASCEθ ⊆ ANEθ . Fix any a∗ = (a∗i )i∈I ∈ ASCEθ and
any player i. By definition of SCE, there is some xˆi ∈ Xi such that a∗i ∈ ri (xˆ∗i ) and fi (a∗i , xˆi) =
fi
(
a∗i , `i
(
a∗−i, θ
))
. By Lemma B a∗i ∈ ri
(
`i
(
a∗−i, θ
))
. This holds for each i, hence a∗ ∈ ANEθ . 
Corollary B provides sufficient conditions for the equivalence between SCE and NE. Next, we
give sufficient conditions that allow a characterization of ASCEθ by means of Nash equilibria of
auxiliary games.
A.3 Equilibrium Characterization
If ai ∈ [0, a¯i] is interpreted as an activity level (e.g., effort) by player i, then it makes sense to say
that i is active if ai > 0 and inactive otherwise. Let I0 denote the set of players for whom
being inactive is justifiable. Note that, by Lemma A,
I0 = {i ∈ I : min ri (Xi) = 0} .
Also, for each θ ∈ Θ and nonempty subset of players J ⊆ I, let ANEJ,θ denote the set of Nash
equilibria of the auxiliary game with players set J obtained by letting ai = 0 for each i ∈ I\J , that
is,
ANEJ,θ =
{
a∗J ∈ ×j∈JAj : ∀j ∈ J, a∗j = rj
(
`j
(
a∗J\{j},0I\J , θ
))}
,
where 0I\J ∈ RI\J is the profile that assigns 0 to each i ∈ I\J . If J = ∅, let ANEJ,θ = ∅ by convention.
Lemma C. Suppose that the parametrized nice game with aggregators and feedback G satisfies
observability by active players. Then, for each θ, the set of selfconfirming action profiles is
ASCEθ =
⋃
I\J⊆I0
ANEJ,θ ×
{
0I\J
}
.
Proof Let J be the set of players i such that a∗i > 0. Fix θ ∈ Θ arbitrarily. Let a∗ ∈ ASCEθ and
fix any i ∈ I. If a∗i = 0, then 0 is justifiable for i, that is i ∈ I0. If a∗i > 0, OiifA implies that fi,a∗i
is injective, that is, action a∗i reveals the payoff state, hence the (shallow) conjecture justifying a
∗
i
is correct: a∗i = ri
(
`i
(
a∗−i, θ
))
. Thus, a∗ =
(
a∗J ,a
∗
I\J
)
so that a∗i = 0 for each i ∈ I\J ⊆ I0, and
a∗j = rj
(
`j
(
a∗J\{j},0I\J , θ
))
> 0 for each j ∈ J . Hence,
a∗ =
(
a∗J ,a
∗
I\J
)
∈ ANEJ,θ ×
{
0I\J
}
with I\J ⊆ I0.
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Let I\J ⊆ I0 and
(
a∗J ,a
∗
I\J
)
∈ ANEθ ×
{
0I\J
}
. Since G satisfies OiffA, for each i ∈ I\J , any
conjecture justifying a∗i = 0 (any xˆi ∈ r−1i (0)) is trivially confirmed. For each j ∈ J , a∗j > 0 is
by assumption the best reply to the correct, hence confirmed, conjecture x∗j = `i
(
a∗J\{j},0I\J , θ
)
.
Hence,
(
a∗J ,a
∗
I\J
)
=
(
a∗J ,0I\J
) ∈ ASCEθ . 
Appendix B Interior Nash equilibria
Propositions 1 and 2 in Section 3 show that in our framework there exists an equivalence between
any selfconfirming equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium of a reduced game in which only active
agents are considered and there is also OiffA. Moreover, we can set any subset of agents to be
inactive. We now provide some results about existence of these selfconfirming equilibria, that will
be useful in proving Proposition 3 in Section 3. We first present sufficient conditions that are
present in the literature for the existence of interior Nash equilibria, then we provide some original
results.
In this appendix we formulate the problem as a linear algebra problem. We consider a square
matrix Z ∈ Rn×n such that zii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We call I the identity matrix, λmax(Z)
the maximal eigenvalue of Z, ρ(Z) the spectral radius of Z (i.e. the largest absolute value of its
eigenvalues), 1 is the vector of all 1’s, 0 is the vector of all 0’s, and  is the strict partial ordering
between vectors (meaning that all the elements in the first vector are pairwise strictly greater than
the elements in the second vector).
Proposition C. If for all i, zii = 0, for all j 6= i, zij ≤ 0, and if ρ(Z) < 1, then (I− Z)−1 1 0.21
There are also results when the sign of the externalities are mixed. We recall that the matrix Z is
symmetrizable if there exists a diagonal matrix Γ and a symmetric matrix Z0 such that Z = ΓZ0.
Note that if Z is symmetrizable then all its eigenvalues are real. If for all i, zii = 0, and Z is
symmetrizable, we define the symmetric matrix Z˜ to be such that z˜ij = zij
√
γiγj .
Proposition D. If for all i, zii = 0, Z is symmetrizable, and if |λmax(Z˜)| < 1, then (I− Z)−1 1
0.22
We provide here below an alternative condition, which does also guarantee all positive solutions.
Proposition E. Consider a square matrix Z ∈ Rn×n such that:
• zii = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n};
21This is Theorem 1 in Ballester et al. (2006). The same result is in Appendix A in Stan´czak et al. (2006).
22See Section VI of Bramoulle´ et al. (2014), generalizing Proposition 2 therein. Note that in their payoff specification
externalities have a minus sign, while in (4) we have a plus sign: this is why we have a condition on the maximal
eigenvalue and not on the minimal eigenvalue.
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• |zij | < 1n for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then (I− Z)−1 1 0.
Proof: Call B = (I− Z). First of all, by Gershgorin circle theorem,23 B has all eigenvalues
strictly between 0 and 2, so det(B) 6= 0.
Consider the n vectors b1, . . . ,bn given by the n rows of B, and take the hyperplane in Rn passing
by those n points:
H = {h ∈ Rn : ∃α ∈ Rn with α′ · 1 = 1 and h = B′α} .
Now, consider the following vector
v = B−11 .
Component vi of v is exactly the sum of the elements in i
th row of B−1. However, v is also a vector
perpendicular to H. That is because for any h ∈ H we have
h · v = (B′α)′ ·B−11
= α′1
=
n∑
i=1
αi = 1 ,
which is a constant.
Now, we want to show that H does not pass thorugh the convex region of vectors with all
non-postitive elements: H ∩ (−∞, 0]n = ∅.
In fact, it is impossible to find α ∈ Rn, such that α′ · 1 = 1 and B′α 0.
If it was the case, by absurdum, we could take k = arg maxi∈{1,...,n}{αi} (αk > 0 because
∑n
i=1 αi =
1), and write
αbk = αk +
∑
j 6=k
αjbjk > αk −
∑
j 6=k
|αj ||zjk| > αk
1−∑
j 6=k
|zjk|
 > 0 ,
which would be a contradiction.
Finally, we show that if an hyperplane H satisfies H ∩ (−∞, 0]n = ∅, then its perpendicular
vector from the origin has all positive elements, and this would close the proof .
We do so by induction on n.
1. n = 2: This is easy to show graphically;
2. Induction hypothesis: Suppose it is true for n = m− 1;
23https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gershgorin_circle_theorem
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3. Induction step: In Rm, a vector v from the origin which is perpendicular to an hyperplane
H not passing through the origin can be obtained in the following way. For each dimension
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} take V ¬i = {v ∈ Rm : vi = 0}. Call H¬i the intersection of H with V ¬i,
and take a vector v¬i ∈ V ¬i from the origin that is perpendicular to H¬i. By the induction
hypothesis v¬i has all positive elements. We can obtain the vector v from the origin that is
perpendicular to H by rescaling each v¬i, such that v¬i is the projection of v on H¬i. By
construction, v will have all positive elements.
Notice that, if Z satisfies the conditions of Proposition E, then it must also hold that |λmax(Z)| <
1, because of Gershgorin circle theorem. However, the condition that |λmax(Z)| < 1 is in general
not sufficient to guarantee that (I− Z)−1 1 0. 
Appendix C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Since every agent is active, state observability by active players implies own action
independence of the feedback about the state. Then, the result derives from Corollary B in Appendix
A. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By Remark 5, NG satisfies observability by active players. Hence, Lemma C in Appendix
A and the best reply equation (6) yield the result. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Condition (i), (ii) and (iii) correspond, respectively, to the conditions in Propositions E,
C and D from Appendix B. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. If for every i ∈ I\Ia∗ we have that α + xˆi < 0, then changing their xˆi such that the
inequality is still strict, will not make them become active.
So, let us focus on the subset Ia∗ of active agents. If we perturb locally the beliefs, we will perturb
locally also their actions. Assumption 4 garantees that the discrete dynamical system defined for
actions by (8) and (9) is stable. So, the variation to beliefs can always be small enough such that:
all their actions remain strictly positive;
we are in a neighborhood of a∗ in the actions’ space, such that the discrete dynamical system
defined for actions by (8) and (9) converges back to a∗. 
34
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. When we remove elements from Ja and set them to 0, it is as if we delete corresponding
rows and columns in the ZJa matrix. By the Cauchy interlace theorem applied to symmetrizable
matrices (see Kouachi 2016) we know that the eigenvalues of the new matrix are between the
minimal and the maximal eigenvalues of the old matrix. 
Proof of Proposition 6
A selfconfirming equilibrium is such that, for all i ∈ I, rationality implies
a∗i = max{0, αi + xˆi} .
Each agent then thinks that
m∗ = αia∗i −
1
2
(a∗i )
2 + a∗i xˆi + yˆi ,
so that
yˆi = m
∗ − αia∗i +
1
2
(a∗i )
2 − a∗i xˆi .
Substituting the expression of the true payoff function
m∗ = αia∗i −
1
2
(a∗i )
2 + a∗ixi + yi
into it, we get the dependence between yˆi and xˆi:
yˆi = yi + a
∗
i (xi − xˆi) .
The first and second items in the proposition are derived, respectively, if a∗i = 0 or a
∗
i > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. First, we derive some properties. Each equation in the system given by (15) can be
written also as a parabola b1a
2
i + b2ai + b3 = 0, in the following way
Hi(a, c,Z) = ci︸︷︷︸
≡b1
a2i +
1− αci − ci
∑
j∈I
zijaj,t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b2
ai
−
1 + ci
β∑
j 6=i
aj,t

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡b3
= 0 . (b)
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So, the solution a∗i to `i(a, c,Z) = 0 lies in the right–arm of an upward parabola, where
d`i
dai
∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
>
0. With respect to ci, each `i(a, c,Z) is a linear equation.
Note also that each ai is bounded in the interval
α < ai < α+
∑
j∈Ni
zijaj
+ β∑k 6=i ak
ai
.
Considering that a∗i is increasing in b3 and decreasing in b2, it is easy to see that each a
∗
i increases
in each aj , with j 6= i.
Second, we show that there is a homeomorphism. There is a continuous function defined
from each c ∈ [0, 1]n to an element a ∈ A, that is because
• either ci = 0 and then a∗i = α;
• or ci > 0 and then each a∗i is continuously increasing in each xj with j 6= i.
lim
ci→0
a∗i = α .
a∗i is bounded above by
α+
∑
j∈Ni
zijaj
+ β∑j 6=i aj
a∗i
.
Since the system defined by (16) admits a solution, also this system has a finite solution.
This function is one–to–one and invertible, because for each a ∈ A, we obtain a unique vector
c ∈ [0, 1]n, and since we obtain it from a linear system of equations, also the inverse function from
A to [0, 1]n is continuous.
To analyze the relation between a∗ and c, we can apply the implicit function theorem to
Fi(a, c,Z).
We can compute
dFi
dci
=
β
∑
j 6=i aj,t
(aici + 1)
2
Now, since
`i(a, c,Z) = −(aici + 1)Fi(x, c) ,
we have that `i(a, c,Z), with respect to ai, has the same zeros as Fi(a, c,Z), and that, for each ai,
`i(a, c,Z) is negative if and only if Fi(a, c,Z) is positive. As they are both continuous functions,
this means that since d`idai
∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
> 0, we have dFidai
∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
< 0. So, we obtain that
dai
dvi
∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
= − ∂Fi/∂ci
∂Fi/∂ai
∣∣∣∣
ai=a∗i
> 0 . (c)
This shows that a∗i is increasing with vi, and the other way round. 
36
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. We consider the system (15)
Fi(a,v,Z) = α+ ci
β∑
j 6=i
aj,t
 aic′i + 1
aici + 1
− ai = 0 ,
with c′i,t =
∑
j∈I zijaj,t
β
∑
j 6=i aj,t
. We can compute its Jacobian, with respect to a, and check that each row
of the Jacobian sum to less than 1, so that the process is always a contraction. The Jacobian J is
such that: {
Jij =
vi
aici+1
(β + aizij)
Jii = ci
(
β
∑
j 6=i aj
)(
c′i
aici+1
− ci aic
′
i+1
(aici+1)2
)
− 1
The sum of each row of the Jacobian is
∑
j
Jij =
ci
aici + 1
β
∑
j 6=i
aj
(c′i − ciaic′i + 1aici + 1
)
+ ai
∑
j 6=i
zi,j
+ β(n− 1)
− 1 (d)
Let us analyze expression (d) with respect to ai, for any ai ≥ 0.
As ai →∞, we have that expression (d) is equal to∑
j 6=i
zi,j − 1 , (e)
whose absolute value is less than one by assumption.
If ai → 0, espression (d) becomes
ciβ
∑
j 6=i
aj
(c′i − ci)+ (n− 1)
− 1 . (f)
An interior maximum or minimum of the numerical expression (d), with respect to ai, must satisfy
first order condition
−
(
ci
aici + 1
)2β
∑
j 6=i
aj
(c′i − ciaic′i + 1aici + 1
)
+ ai
∑
j 6=i
zi,j
+ β(n− 1)

+
ci
aici + 1
β
∑
j 6=i
aj
( ci
aici + 1
)(
c′i − ci
aic
′
i + 1
aici + 1
)
+
∑
j 6=i
zi,j
 = 0
Last expression can be simplified and results in
viβ(n− 1) =
∑
j 6=i
zi,j ,
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which is independent on ai. So, the only candidates for being minima or maxima for espression (d)
are its value in the extrema, namely (e) and (f).
Also, the sign of the first derivative of (d) with respect to ai is equal to the sign of
∑
j 6=i zi,j −
ciβ(n− 1). So, if ciβ(n− 1) <
∑
j 6=i zi,j we have that (d) is strictly increasing in ai, and then (e)
is strictly greater than (f).
The value of (e) is between −1 and 1, by assumption, because 0 <∑j 6=i zi,j < 2.
The quantity in (f) is minimized by vi → 0; and c′i → 0. In this case (f) goes to −1 from the
right, and for any ci > 0 it will be greater than −1. This complete the proof, because we have
shown that any row of the Jacobian J sums to a number between −1 an 1. 
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